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THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF OHIO'S
MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:

MINORS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

A

s WITH ALL LAWS, statutes of limitations must apply equally to all persons

unless reasonable grounds permit the legislating body to make distinctions between classes of persons affected by the law.' Laws that operate
unequally, unfairly and unreasonably when applied to the public are unconstitutional. The Ohio Supreme Court addressed was the constitutionality of an Ohio
medical malpractice statute of limitations in Schwan v. Riverside Methodist
Hospital.'

The appellee in Schwan was fourteen years old when the appellant-hospital
treated him on July 18, 1977. On November 21, 1979, Schwan filed a complaint alleging an injury resulting from negligent treatment by the hospital's
employees. The hospital moved for summary judgement, claiming that the action
was barred by the statute of limitations - Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.11.1
The court of common pleas granted the motion and Schwan appealed."
The Court of Appeals for Franklin County reversed, holding that section
2305.11 (B) was unconstitutional as applied to medical malpractice litigants who
are minors. 5 The Ohio Supreme Court, in reviewing the appellate court deci-6
sion, centered its analysis on Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.11 (A) and (B).
'Porter v. Oberlin, 1 Ohio St. 2d 143, 205 N.E.2d 363 (1965).
26 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983).
3
0HIO RaV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page Supp. 1982), reading in pertinent part:
(A) An action for... malpractice against a physician, podiatrist, hospital, or dentist, or upon
a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, shall be brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued...
If a witten notice, prior to the expiration of time contained in this division, is given to any
person in a medical claim that an individual is presently considering bringing an action against
that person relating to professional services provided to that individual, then an action by that individual against that person may be commenced at any time within one hundred eighty days after
that notice is given.
(B) In no event shall any medical claim against a physician, podiatrist, or a hospital or dental
claim against a dentist be brought more than four years after the act or omission constituting the
alleged malpractice occurred. The limitations in this section for filing such a malpractice action
against a physician, podiatrist, hospital, or dentist apply to all persons regardless of legal disability
and notwithstanding section 2305.16 of the Revised Code, provided that a minor who has not attained his tenth birthday shall have until his fourteenth birthday in which to Ile an action for malpractice against a physician or hospital.
'Id. at 300, 452 N.E.2d at 1337-38.
'Id. at 300, 452 N.E.2d at 1338.
,Id.
[663]
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Section 2305.1 (A) allows one year for filing a malpractice action against
a hospital; this period may be extended up to an additional 180 days if certain
procedures are followed. 7 Section 2305.11(B), the pivotal statute in this case,
absolutely precludes the filing of any malpractice action against a hospital after
four years following the alleged negligent act or omission. This Section applies
to all persons regardless of any legal disability such as minority.' However,
Section 2305.11 (B) also provides that "a minor who has not attained his tenth
birthday shall have until his fourteenth birthday in which to file an action for
malpractice against a physician or hospital." 9 This language clearly creates two
separate classes of litigants: minors above the age of ten and minors below
the age of ten.
Despite a presumption that acts of the General Assembly are constitutional,' 0 the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio Revised Code Section
2305.1 I(B) violated the right of minor malpractice litigants to "equal protection" under the law; therefore the statutory section was unconstitutional."
Equal protection requries the state to have reasonable grounds for any
distinctions between those within and without a particular class. To legitimately
make a distinction between those within and without a particular class, the
legislature must show reasonable grounds for creating such a distinction.' 2 This
can be accomplished by showing that the class differentiation rationally furthers
the stated objective of the legislation:' 3 this is known as the "rational basis"
test." Therefore, if it is conceivable that the statutory classification rationally
furthers a legitimate objective, then the statute is constitutional."
In Denicola v. ProvidenceHospital,'I the Ohio Supreme Court declared
the malpractice statute of limitations to be "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety. [Such] ... immediate action is
necessary to insure a continuance of health care delivery to the citizens of
Ohio.' ' 7 This is an enviable and certainly legitimate objective, but the question of whether the age classification created by the statute actually furthers
this objective must still be answered.
'Id. at 310, 452 N.E.2d at 1338 (citing OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(A)(Page Supp. 1983)).

'Id. (citing OHIo REV. CODE ANN.§ 2305.1l(B)(Page Supp. 1983)).
9Id.
0Id. (citing Beatty v. Akron City Hospital, 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 493, 424 N.E.2d 586, 592-93(1981)).

"Id. See also OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.
"Id. at 302, 452 N.E.2d at 1339 (citing Porter, 1 Ohio St. 2d 143, 205 N.E.2d 363; State v. Buckley, 16

Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66(1968)).
"Id. at 301-02, 452 N.E.2d at 1339 (citing Denicola v. Providence Hospital, 57 Ohio St. 2d 115, 119-20,
387 N.E.2d 231, 234 (1979)).
"Id. at 301, 452 N.E.2d at 1338.

"Id. (citing Denicola, 57 Ohio St. 2d at 119, 387 N.E.2d at 234).
"57 Ohio St. 2d 115, 387 N.E.2d 231 (1979).

"Id. at 301-02, 452 N.E.2d at 1339 (citing Denicolk, 57 Ohio St. 2d at 120, 387 N.E.2d at 234).
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The Schwan court adeptly answered this question by posing a realistic
hypothentical fact situation. Judge Locher, writing for the majority,I8 reasoned that under Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.11(B) a child one day short
of being ten years old could file a malpractice action any time within the next
four years and one day. Yet, had that same cause of action accrued on the
day after the child's tenth birthday, his complaint would have to be filed within
one year as required by Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.11(A).' 9
It is hard to contemplate how such a statutory construction could further
any state interest. Although it is true that the General Assembly must often
draw lines in legislation, 2" those lines must be determined rationally, not arbitrarily. A good argument, by contrast, can be made for creating a legal distinction between minors and adults. The Schwan court acknowledged this by saying:
Young people eargerly anticipate their legal "adulthood." At the age of
majority, our society puts them on notice that they are assuming an array
of rights and responsibilities which they never had before. Age ten, however, arrives with little fanfare. It is difficult to imagine that parents or guardians - much less the children themselves - would recognize that any
change in status occurs on a child's tenth birthday.2 '
A distinction within a class of minors - especially one between minors
under ten and those over ten - makes little if no sense22 and certainly does
not rationally further any state interest.2" Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court
determined Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.1 (B) to be unconstitutional on
its face with respect to medical malpractice litigants who are minors,2" because
it violated the equal protection clause of the Ohio Constitution.2 5
Judge Locher's opinion leaves a significant issue unresolved: whether all
minors should have to comply with Section 2305.1 l(A)'s one year filing requirement, or whether all minors should be given a longer period in which to
file their complaints. Each alternative raises the same equal protection questions because each creates a distinction between minors and adults.
Judge Brown, in his separate concurring opinion, hinted at a viable solution. Judge Brown based most of his opinion on the rationale used by the Texas
Supreme Court in Sax v. Votteler.2 In Sax, the Texas court invalidated a pro"Schwan, 6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337. Chief Justice Celebreeze and Justices Patton and Sweeney
joined in Justice Locher's opinion; Justices Patton, C. Brown and Koehier concurred separately. Justice
Holmes was the lone dissenter.
"Id. at 302, 452 N.E.2d at 1339.
201d.
21
Id.
2 Id.
2id. at 303, 452 N.E.2d at 1339.
241d.

"See OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.
26648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983)[hereinafter cited as Sax].
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vision similar to that held unconstitutional in Schwan." That court stressed
that a provision similar to Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.11(B) restricted
the right of minors over ten years of age to sue and consequently violated two
due process clauses of the Texas Constitution.2 The Sax court concluded that
such an age distinction was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional. 29
Judge Brown then went on to adopt the Sax court's reasoning that "[t]o
argue that parents will adequately protect the rights of children is neither
reasonable nor realistic, since the parents themselves may be minors, ignorant,
lethargic, or lack concern to bring a malpractice action within the time provided by statute." 3 Thus, Judge Brown believed that a longer period for filing
malpractice actions was necessary. Given the Sax logic that minors are inherently
disadvantaged when it comes to suing, it is easy to see how a different statute
of limitations for minors could rationally further the state's objective of protecting its citizens and their rights.
The Schwan Court, in reviewing a recent Ohio case, Vance v. St. Vincent
HospitalandMedical Center,3 ' manifested its support for an extended statutory
period of limitations for minor litigants in malpractice actions. In Vance, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that, "[A] minor of 10 years of age or older must
file a medical malpractice action within the time limitations set forth in R.C.
2305.1 I(A) and (B), notwithstanding R.C. 2305.16." 32 This means that the action
must be filed within one year of discovery of the ailment, or the time in which
a reasonable person should discover the ailment, but no later than four years
after the alleged malpractice occurred. If the victim is under ten years old, he
may file any time before his fourteenth birthday.
The minor in Vance was seventeen when the alleged malpracice took place
and was therefore subject to the one year limitations period of Ohio Revised
Code Section 2305.11 (A). The minor's failure to file within that period barred
her action." However, after finding Section 2305.11(B) unconstitutional, in
that it irrationally discriminated against minors over the age of ten, the Supreme
Court was compelled to overrule the Vance decision.3"
Judge Locher also attempted to distinguish the recent cases of Baird v.

"Schwan, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 303-04, 452 N.E.2d at 1340 (citing Sax, 648 S.W.2d 661).
"Schwan, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 304, 452 N.E.2d at 1340 (citing Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 664); OHiO CONST. art.
I, § 16.
"Id. at 304, 452 N.E.2d at 1341 (citing Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 666-67).
30Id.
3'64

Ohio St. 2d 36, 414 N.E.2d 406 (1980)

"Schwan,6 Ohio St. 3d at 301, 452 N.E.2d at 1338 (citing Vance, 64 Ohio St. 2d at 36, 414 N.E.2d at 406).
"See generally Vance, 64 Ohio St. 2d 36, 414 N.E.2d 406.
"Schwan, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 303, 452 N.E.2d at 1339.
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Loeffler" and Meros v. University Hospitals, 36 which applied Ohio Revised
Code Section 2305.1 (B), although they did not deal with equal protection.I7
Judge Brown took the opposite stance in his concurring opinion. He stated
that the Schwan majority overruled both Baird and Meros because the latter
cares applied Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.11(B), determined to be unconstitutional by the Schwan majority. 3"
In light of the Schwan opinion, it is highly probable the Ohio General
Assembly and the Ohio Supreme Court will make a concerted effort to more
clearly spell out their positions on an equitable statute of limitations period
for minors in malpractice litigation. Such action is imperative to avoid confusion and conflict in the future.

ERIC A. BRANDT

"69 Ohio St. 2d 533, 433 N.E.2d 194 (1982).
370 Ohio St. 2d 143, 435 N.E.2d 1117 (1982).
"Schwan, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 303, 452 N.E.2d at 1339-40.
"Id. at 303-04, 452 N.E.2d at 1340.
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